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NOTES AND COMMENT
SEPARATE PROSECUTIONS OF CO-DEFENDANTS FOR FAIR TRIAL

In 1926, the New York Code of Criminal Procedure underwent a
number of changes designed to facilitate the prosecution of criminal
cases.' One of the most important of these was an amendment to
Section 391 of the Code, which now provides: "Defendants jointly
indicted may be tried separately or jointly in the discretion of the
court." 2 The original section, enacted in 1829, prior to the amendment, provided as follows: "When two or more defendants are jointly
indicted for a felony, any defendant requiring it must be tried separately. In other cases, defendants jointly indicted may be tried separately or jointly in the discretion of the court." 3 The background of
this generous statute is found in the early common law which gave
inadequate protection to the riglits of an accused when jointly tried
with others. 4 Under special circumstances, however, the practice
arose to permit a defendant to be tried separately. 5 The right of a
prisoner in a joint trial to exercise his full number of peremptory
challenges 0 and the small number of jurors returned at the assize were
the reasons for the necessity to direct a separate trial when the prisoner refused to join in the challenges.1 This is not to be construed as
meaning that the prisoner could demand to have a severance as a
matter of right. But it was believed that he was at least entitled to
object to and exclude certain of his "neighbors" 8 who might be unduly
prejudiced against his case.9 The common law rule became well established that severance of the prosecution was entirely a discretionary
matter.1 0
1 (1926) 26 Co. L. REv. 752; REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE
COORDINATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PRACTICE ACTS (Leg. Doc. 84, N. Y.

1926) 21; O'Toole, Artificial Prestmptions it;
the Criminal Law (1937) 11 ST.
L. Rv. 167.
2 N. Y. CODE CRim. PROC. § 391 (1926).
3 REV. STAT. § 20, codified by the Laws of 1881, c. 504, § 391.
4United States v. Marchant, 12 Wheat. 480 (U. S. 1827) ; Rex v. Noble,
15 How. St. Tr. 731 (1713).
GSee note 4, supra.
64 BL COMM. *352, 353.
7See note 4, supra.
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8 See BOWMAN, HANDBOOK OF ELEMENTARY LAW (1929) 178.
91 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1927) 324 ("As early as the

days of Bracton, it was recognized that upon an inquiry as to his guilt or
innocence, the prisoner ought to be allowed to object to members of the jury on
the ground that they were his personal enemies") ; Note (1939) 14 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 142.
10 People v. Howell, 4 Johns. 296 (N. Y. 1809) (In all cases, at least where
the right of peremptory challenge does not exist, and two persons are indicted
jointly, they may be tried jofitly or .separately in the discretion of the court) ;
People v. Vermilyea, 7 Cow. 369 (N. Y. 1827) ; Rex v. Noble, 15 How. St. Tr.
731 (1713).
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In New York, for almost a century, any accused could avail himself of the protection afforded him by the legislature and could demand
as a matter of right to be tried separately and apart from any of his
co-defendants. 11 Not only did this statute assure him of his full
number of peremptory challenges,' 2 but it acted as a guarantee of a
fair and impartial trial, free from the evils that result from mass
indictments and its mesh of evidence. It is, therefore, with some
seriousness and c6ncern that we must view this amendment which has
deprived him of so valuable a right. This concern mounts to a higher
degree when we observe that within the fourteen years that this statute has been in operation, there have been distressingly few motions
for severance granted.
II
The amended Section 391 of the Code was enacted to secure
certain advantages to the prosecution, namely, to discourage the
intimidation and inconvenience of witnesses, to cut down the number
of necessary panels of jurymen, to eliminate some of the hardship in
the preparation of a case for the state, to lessen the cost of prosecution
for the taxpayer, and in general, to expedite justice.13 But the
expedition of justice is not necessarily justice, and the legislature and
judiciary should not blind themselves to this very significant element
of the democratic process, which for so long
a time guaranteed the
4
fairest trial that could be given an accused.'
"See

f
note 4, supra; People v. Williams, 19 Wend. 377 (N. Y. 1838)

(before this statute the discretion existed in all cases where the right of peremptory challenge, was not involved; the statute secures a right to a defendant
indicted upon a charge of felony that did-not exist before; that is, a separate
trial where he is not entitled to a peremptory challenge).
112 Peremptory challenges are regulated by statute. See N. Y. CODE Camn.
PRoc. §§ 359, 372, 385, 386; see also Note (1939) 14 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 142.
'3 REPORT OF THE JOINT L-Isx.ATivE COMMITTEE

ON THE COORDINATION OF

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PRACTiCE ACTs (Leg. Doc. No. 84, N. Y. 1926) 21; 1936
COL. L. REv. 1359; Hiscock, Criminal Law and Procedure in New York (1926)

26 COL.
4 L. REv. 257.

1 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 47 Sup. Ct. 437 (1927) (The defendant,
according to the due process of law, is entitled to a fair and impartial tribunal
inluding the jury); United States v. Mathews (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1843) Fed.
Cas. No. 15741b ("In a capital case and in favor of life, I am disposed to secure
every protection to the prisoner against the influence of testimony not strictly
applicable to him") ; Lehmai J,, dissenting in People v. Fisher, 249 N. Y. 419,
432, 164 N. E. 336, 341 (1928) ("We destroy the age-old rule which in the past
has been regarded as a fundamental principle of our jurisp'udence by a legalistic formula, that the jury may not consider any admissions against any party
who did not join in them. We secure greater speed, economy and convenience

in the administration of the law at the price of fundamental principles of constitutional liberty. That price is too high. Our ideal is that justice should be
swift and certain. Human justice is still far from that ideal; and sometimes I
feel that a proper zeal to destroy technicalities and achieve a more efficient
administration of justice leads us to disregard fundamental principles and guaranties").
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In the carrying out of this new legislative pattern for law enforcement, it was promptly settled that a defendant has no constitutional
right to a peremptory challenge and that"it is a matter resting solely
with the legislature. 15 In other words, co-defendants must share only
a proportionate number of the challenges that are" permissible to a
single defendant.
Where a trial judge has been extended discretionary powers, it
is well established that his decision will not be reversed unless that
discretion has been abused. 16 When a motion for severance has been
made at the beginning of a trial, the court must decide whether or not
the case as to any defendant can be weighed fairly by the jury.' 7
Judge Lehman, in a dissenting opinion, aptly set forth these significant
and thought-provoking remarks: "Upon a joint trial, the jury is called
upon to decide the guilt of each accused. The jury hears the evidence
produced against all. Evidence which is relevant as to the guilt of
one accused may be irrelevant upon the guilt of a co-defendant. One
defendant made admissions or confessions which are competent evidence against him. They are inadmissible against the other defendants. The jury must sift the evidence produced before it, and in
arriving at its determination of the guilt of each defendant it may consider only the evidence which is competent and relevant against that
particular defendant. We may assume that jurors will try to obey
the instructions of the court and to give to each defendant a fair trial.
The question will always remain whether they can do so in a particular case." 13

What attitude has our Court of Appeals adopted toward the
question of separate trials? In People v. Feolo,19 the court, for the
first time in the history of the statute, found an abuse of discretion on
the part of a trial judge in denying motions made for severance. Three
of the moving defendants were indicted with one other for murder in
the first degree. Six years prior to the trial a speak-easy was held up
and a police officer was killed. One Funicello, imprisoned for life as
a fourth offender, motivated by wrath and a desire for vengeance, was
given a hearing by the authorities at his request, the outcome of which
was the trial of these defendants. The fourth defendant confessed,
implicating the three moving defendants, and his confession coincided
factually with the testimony of Funicello. But there was no other
damaging evidence.
25 People v. Doran, 246 N. Y. 409, 159 N. E. 379 (1927) ; People v. Gaskill,
132 Misc. 318, 229 N. Y. Supp. 731 (1920); People v. Kassis, 145 Misc. 483,
259 N. Y. Supp. 339 (1931) ; N. Y. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 360.
16 People v. Ferris, 76 N. Y. 326 (1879) ; People v. Doran, 246 N. Y. 496,
159 N. E. 379 (1927) ; People v. Coffin, 7 Hun 608 (N. Y. 1876) ; Silverman v.
Baruth, 42 App. Div. 21, 58 N. Y. Supp. 663 (1st Dept. 1899).
17 People v. Fisher, 249 N. Y. 419, 164 N. E. 336 (1928)
(the point at
which discretion ends and severance becomes a duty is at times hard to fix).
Is Lehman, J., dissenting, in People v. Fisher, 249 N. Y. 419, 428, 164 N. E.
336, 339 (1928).
19 282 N. Y. 278, 26 N. E. (2d) 257 (1940).
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Before we can fully appreciate the reasoning which led to the
decision of the court in the Feolo case, it may be best to examine the
rulings of the court in three other related cases. It is also necessary
to keep in mind that confessions may be used as evidence only against
the confessor and cannot be binding upon another. 20 In People v.
Doran,21 both defendants confessed to the killing. Doran, at the
trial, retracted his confession and sought to establish an alibi. Both
defendants moved for separate trials, but both were denied. This was
held not to constitute error. The mere fact that confessions had been
made did not require the granting of separate trials. 22 That same
year the case of People v. Snyder 23 presented the court with a similar
issue. Here both defendants confessed. Snyder then retracted her
confession and asked for a separate trial, claiming that Gray would
attempt to exculpate himself by shifting the blame to the moving
defendant. Her motion was denied, and in affirming the conviction,
the Court of Appeals laid down a general test as to when the discretion
of the trial judge should be exercised: "Will a separate trial impede
or assist the proper administration of justice in a particular case and
secure the accused the right of a fair trial? The decision of the trial
court rendered before the trial is dictated by a reasonable anticipation
based on the facts then disclosed. The decision of this court rendered
upon a review of the trial itself rests upon the determination of whether
the prophecy had been realized." 2 4 The court could find no possible
injustice resulting to Mrs. Snyder from the presentation to the jury of
Gray's confession. Although it accused her, and in spite of the fact
that his testimony confirmed her own, the court2 was
satisfied that her
5
guilt was demonstrated by her own disclosures.
In People v. Fisher,2 6 two of the three defendants confessed their
guilt implicating Fisher, the third accused, who denied his guilt. The
confessions were then withdrawn. The trial judge denied motions
for separate trials and the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that if
Fisher's conviction rested solely upon the confessions, it could not
20 Hogan v. United'States, 268 Fed. 344 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920); United
States v. Rockefeller, 222 Fed. 534, 536 (S.D. N. Y. 1915) ; People v. Kief,
126 N. Y. 661, 27 N. E. 358 (1891); People v. Doran, 246 N. Y. 409, 159 N. E.
379 (1927) ; People v. Malkin, 218 App. Div. 635, 219 N. Y. Supp. 5 (2d Dept.
1926).
21246 N. Y. 409, 159 N. E. 379 (1927).
22 Id. at 425, 159 N. E. at 385; Ball v. United States, 163 U. S. 662, 16
Sup. Ct. 1192 (1895).
23246 N. Y. 491, 159 N. E. 408 (1927).
24 Id. at 497, 159 N. E. at 410.
25 People v. Snyder, 246 N. Y. 491, 498, 159 N. E. 408, 410 (1927) (The
court said: "Possibility of injury to Snyder by presentation of Gray's confession which accused her, to the jury, though it might not be properly used as
evidence against her, is not substantial when her own confession shows her
guilt. Possibility of such injury disappears when Gray takes the stand at the
trial and gives testimony of the very same facts which Mrs. Snyder claimed
should not be disclosed to the jury").
26249 N. Y. 419, 164 N. E. 336 (1928).
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stand. The court was satisfied that even without the confession the
result would be the same,27 since the evidence independent of the confession was strong enough to warrant conviction.
Judge Lehman, with whom Judge Kellogg concurred, did not
agree with the majority. He contended that the guilt or innocence of
Fisher was based on disputed facts and circumstances which the jury
was called upon to weigh independent of those confessions. Is it a
certainty that they did so when those confessions and admissions had
been considered by the jury to establish the truth and accuracy of the
witnesses
for the state? Judge Lehman doubted their ability to
28
do so.
To have a complete understanding of the fullest significance of
these cases it is relevant to quote from another part of the Fisher
case: "In a case, where without the existence of a confession by one
defendant, the evidence against another would be too weak to justify
a conviction or even where a conviction would be doubtful, our review
of the judgment would compel us to conclude that an abuse of discretion had been committed. One who makes no confession must be
found guilty, if at all, only on proof independent of a confession by a
co-defendant." 29
In both the Doran and Snyder cases it will be observed that the
confessions were not directly pertinent to the guilt of the moving
defendants, though it is hypocritical to maintain that the jury goes
entirely uninfluenced by the confession of the co-defendant. 30 However, in the Fisher case, which seems to be on the borderline, the confessions played a decisive factor in arriving at the guilt of Fisher,
inasmuch as they were used to establish the credibility and accuracy
of testimony which led to conviction.
Therefore, in the final analysis, the Feolo decision gives reason to
believe that the Court of Appeals has relented somewhat in its attitude
toward the problem of dealing with confessions on joint trials. As in
the Fisher case, the jury was permitted to consider the confession of a
co-defendant in order to find substantiation for the very damaging
27 Id. at 426, 164 N. E. at 336 (The Court reasoned: "Varying circumstances bear upon the soundness of discretion to be exercised under Section 391,
in refusing to grant motions for separate trials. The rule is not doubtful. - We
have expressed it in the Doran and Snyder cases. Its correct application must
rest upon the facts in each case. Prospection by the trial judge is not final. A
retrospective view by an appellate court may reveal injustice or impairment of
substantial rights unseen at the beginning").
28 People v. Fisher, 249 N. Y. 419, 431, 164 N. E. 339, 340 (1928) (dissenting opinion, per Lehman, J.) ("We may well assume that the jury understood
that the confessions and admission might not be considered against Fisher, but
when the confessions and admission had resulted in establishing the truth of the
testimony given by Krassner and Stoller [witnesses for the state], could the
jury then weigh the credibility of that testimony over again, ignoring the very
testimony which had already substantiated it? Certainly jurors are not accustomed to weigh evidence in that manner and I confess that neither legal training
nor long judicial experience has given me the ability to do so").
29 People v. Fisher, 249 N. Y. 419, 427, 164 N. E. 336, 339 (1928).
30 People v. Wargo, 149 Misc. 461, 462, 258 N. Y. Supp. 400, 401 (1933).
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testimony of Funicello, a doubtful witness. 3' In both the Ficher and
Feolo cases it seems quite uncertain that if the confession were entirely
out of the evidentiary picture that the jury would, beyond all doubt,
have reached the same conclusion.
In several instances, trial courts of this state granted motions for
severance. In People v. Wargo,3 2 there was a situation similar to
that of the Snyder case, except for the fact that the moving defendant
had not confessed. The motion was granted because of the antagonistic interests 3 of the two defendants, as the woman denied actual
participation in the killing. In addition, her co-defendant confessed
but she did not.

We quote from the court's opinion: " * * * the pos-

sible and perhaps probable fact that without the improper effect upon
a juror's mind of the confession of the man, a conviction could not be
had of the woman * ** " 34
The late case of People v. Lashkowitz 35 also illustrates how Section 391 may be applied. Where a substantial part of the evidence
against the moving defendant consisted of no more than the confession
of one accomplice and testimony of another accomplice as witness for
the People, the case is of such a nature as possibly to "unconsciously
result in an unfair trial to the one who had neither confessed nor
become a witness for the prosecution, if they were all tried together." 36
Severance was properly granted.
31
There was also the question for the jury to decide whether or not
Funicello was an accomplice, since his story of antecedent association with
Feolo did not go wholly uncontradicted.
32 149 Misc. 461, 268 N. Y. Supp. 400 (1933).
33 Antagonistic defenses calculated to prejudice one of several defendants
jointly accused, will move the discretion of the court to grant that one a separate
trial. United States v. Ball, 163 U. S. 672, 16 Sup. Ct. 1192 (1895) ; People v.
Braune, 363 Ill. 551, 2 N. E. (2d) 839 (1936) (In view of the substantial
hostility between the defendants, with each condemning the other, the judge
could not have protected the defendants); for other grounds for severance,
People v. Singer, N. Y. L. J., Dec. 29, 1937, p. 2295, col. 7 M and People v.
Kleinman, N. Y. L. J., Mar. 14, 1939, p. 1256, col. 1 F (holding that since codefendant's reputation was good as a lawyer and assistant district attorney, the
court would grant a separate trial from other co-defendants whose records
might result in prejudice to the moving defendant). See also Suarez v. State
of Florida, 95 Fla. 42,-115 So. 519 (1928).
34 People v. Wargo, '149 Misc. 461, 462, 268 N. Y. Supp. 400, 403 (1933)
(Theoretically easy, it is practically difficult for any court to properly instruct a
jury on these important phases of the case. Across that bridge lies the inability
of any ordinary juror to grasp and obey such instructions; citing People v.
Fisher, 249 N. Y. 419 at 425).
-9 166 Misc. 640, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 98 (1938).
86Id. at 640, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) at 102 (The judge defined an impartial jury
as "one which is of that frame of mind at the-beginning of the trial, one which
is influenced during the trial only by legal and competent evidence produced
during the trial against the defendant and which bases its verdict upon the
evidence connecting that defendant with the commission of that crime"); U. S.
CoNsT. Art. VI.
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The duties of the trial judge involve great responsibilities. 37 He
must constantly be alert to the introduction of evidence into the record
which may be indiscreet as to the rights of any one of several defendants, and result in possible confusing and intermingling of issues in
the minds of the jury.35 Deliberate care must be exercised where
there is a confession or admission that may possibly incriminate a
co-defendant, when the rest of the evidence appears to be of a weak
and highly speculative character. In recent years there have been
numerous reversals of convictions actually based on that type of flimsy
and unreliable evidence which, independent of a confession or uncorroborated testimony of 89
an accomplice, was totally insufficient for the
state to rest its case on.
BERNARD STRASSBURG.
THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION AS AFFECTING

PUBLIC OFFICERS AND ATTORNEYS
In General
"* * * No person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense: nor shall he be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, providing that any public officer who
upon being called before a grand jury to testify concerning the conduct of his office or the performance of his official duties, refuses to
sign a waiver of immunity against subsequent criminal prosecution,
or to answer any relevant question concerning such matters before
such grand jury, shall be removed from office by the appropriate au37 Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U. S. 1, 19 Sup. Ct. 580 (1898); 12
REPORTS OF THE AiinacAN BAR AssocuTiON 275.
38 People v. Hooghkert, 96 N. Y. 149 (1884) ; People v. Dixon 231 N. Y.

111, 131 N. E. 752 (1921) ; People v. Reddy, 261 N. Y. 479, 483, 18 5 N. E. 705,
706 (1933) ("Here there is a typical case of conflict between the public need
of bringing to justice one against whom suspicion of guilt exists, and the
undivided right of the suspect to be safeguarded within the law against the
effect of tainted evidence").
39 People v. Rutigliano, 261 N. Y. 103, 184 N. E. 689 (1933) ; People v.
Dolce, 261 N. Y. 108, 184 N. E. 690 (1933) (The trial court held that a confession in the presence of his co-defendant who did not protest at the time was
admissible against the latter. The Court of Appeals reversed on the ground
that silence while under arrest was no admission of guilt) ; People v. Reddy,
261 N. Y. 479, 185 N. E. 705 (1933) (The court held it to constitute error on
the part of the trial court to allow the case to go before a jury where all the
evidence against the defendant was that he broke parole right after the crime.
This was interpreted as flight. On the strength of that evidence and the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice a jury found him guilty); People v.
Pignataro, 263 N. Y. 229, 188 N. E. 720 (1934).

